Just in case there's any doubt, let me make one thing perfectly clear.1 Yesterday I illustrated two cases in which a debate about conservation strategies hinges more on competing ethical and aesthetic values than on competing scientific hypotheses. I am not claiming that there's something wrong with ethical and aesthetic values playing a role. In fact, they are absolutely fundamental.
Debates like those I outlined yesterday won't be settled by collecting more data or conducting more refined analyses. They can only be settled when ethical or aesthetic arguments cause one or both parties to adopt new values or when a political process determines that those attached to one set of values will prevail. Scientists often see the difference between what we recommend and the policies that are adopted as "interference" or "meddling". But we're wrong to do so.
We have two choices when giving advice on policy: (1) Lay out a set of options, describe the consequences of adopting each option, and refrain from suggesting that one option is the "best" or that another is the "worst". (2) Lay out a set of options, describe the consequences of adopting each option, and recomend an option, recognizing that recommendation we make is based on what we believe to be "valuable" or "good" and that those who receive our recommendation may not share those beliefs.
Neither option is obviously better than the other.
Option 1 has the advantage making a clear distinction between questions that can be answered by science and those that can't. It keeps science separate from politics.2 But it means that the scientist gives up her/his right as a citizen to express a preference for a particular outcome. It means keeping our opinions to ourselves, even if the issue is one that we care about deeply. It would mean, for example, not caring whether the ways in which assisted migration changes ecological communities is good or bad. And it means that policy makers might not receive advice from those who have spent the most time studying the advantages and disadvantages of different choices.
Option 2 has the advantage of allowing a scientist to express a preference for a particular outcome in the same way as any other citizen. And because the scientist has probably studied the issues more carefully than many others (s)he will probably have a better understanding of the consequences of different choices than someone who is merely told about them. The opinion expressed by such a scientist isn't just a whim or a prejudice, it's a well-informed opinion. And it seems as if we'd want our policy makers to listen to well-informed opinions. But it has the disadvantage is that it becomes very easy for science to become entangled.
Which is the greater risk? Providing policy makers with well-informed opinions in addition to a range of options or compromising the separation of science and politics? That would be another values question. And it's one I'm not going to answer, at least not right now.
Debates like those I outlined yesterday won't be settled by collecting more data or conducting more refined analyses. They can only be settled when ethical or aesthetic arguments cause one or both parties to adopt new values or when a political process determines that those attached to one set of values will prevail. Scientists often see the difference between what we recommend and the policies that are adopted as "interference" or "meddling". But we're wrong to do so.
We have two choices when giving advice on policy: (1) Lay out a set of options, describe the consequences of adopting each option, and refrain from suggesting that one option is the "best" or that another is the "worst". (2) Lay out a set of options, describe the consequences of adopting each option, and recomend an option, recognizing that recommendation we make is based on what we believe to be "valuable" or "good" and that those who receive our recommendation may not share those beliefs.
Neither option is obviously better than the other.
Option 1 has the advantage making a clear distinction between questions that can be answered by science and those that can't. It keeps science separate from politics.2 But it means that the scientist gives up her/his right as a citizen to express a preference for a particular outcome. It means keeping our opinions to ourselves, even if the issue is one that we care about deeply. It would mean, for example, not caring whether the ways in which assisted migration changes ecological communities is good or bad. And it means that policy makers might not receive advice from those who have spent the most time studying the advantages and disadvantages of different choices.
Option 2 has the advantage of allowing a scientist to express a preference for a particular outcome in the same way as any other citizen. And because the scientist has probably studied the issues more carefully than many others (s)he will probably have a better understanding of the consequences of different choices than someone who is merely told about them. The opinion expressed by such a scientist isn't just a whim or a prejudice, it's a well-informed opinion. And it seems as if we'd want our policy makers to listen to well-informed opinions. But it has the disadvantage is that it becomes very easy for science to become entangled.
Which is the greater risk? Providing policy makers with well-informed opinions in addition to a range of options or compromising the separation of science and politics? That would be another values question. And it's one I'm not going to answer, at least not right now.
1Yes, Virginia, I am old enough to know that makes me sound like Richard Nixon.
2Or as separate from politics as anything can be in this world.
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