Matt Nisbet and Chris Mooney ignited a flame war in the blogosphere1 last year when they published a Policy Forum in Science arguing that
[S]cientists should strategically avoid emphasizing the technical details of science when trying to defend it.If you look at posts where I've discussed framing, you'll see that I largely agree with their argument. In particular, in a couple of recent posts on being persuasive, I pointed out that
Debates aren't won by the person who has the strongest arguments and the greatest volume of evidence. They're won by the person who is perceived as most trustworthy.All of that is true, but it raises a larger issue about the appropriate role of science and scientists in public policy. Let's take as an example the revisions to Endangered Species Act regulations that Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthone recently proposed.
If you've read what I've written, you'll know that I think the revisions are ill advised. You also know that I'm a scientist. Does that mean that it's my scientific expertise that tells me the revisions are ill advised. No.
The revisions would, among other things,
Look carefully at that last sentence. "if we care about the hens...." Can science tell us whether we should worry about hens -- endangered species? No. How much we should care about endangered species is a question of ethical and aesthetic values. So there's a second sense in which it isn't my scientific expertise isn't what tells me that the revisions are a bad idea.
My scientific expertise tells me that the rate at which we are currently losing species is greater than at any time in the last sixty five million years. My scientific expertise tells me that the species we are losing are those that are unique to particular places on the globe and that the species replacing them are becoming more and more widespread. My scientific expertise tells me that the world is becoming more biologically homogeneous. My scientific expertise tells me that the increased homogenization may make ecosystems more sensitive to perturbation. My scientific expertise tells me that the biotic environment at the end of the 21st century will be very different from the one we have now if current trends continue.
But my scientific expertise can't tell me whether any of those things are good or bad.2 Whether an outcome is good or bad depends on whether it matches the way we want the world to be, and I don't need an experiment to tell me that I prefer a world with abundant biodiversity to one dominated by a few ubiquitous species. My preference for a world full of diversity is an ethical or aesthetic preference, not a scientific one.
Why do I go on so long about this, and how does it relate to framing and persuasion? Like this.
Framing is necessary for persuasion. Framing is necessary, for example, to persuade people that loss of biodiversity is a crisis that demands attention. But in making that case I am focusing more on convincing others that my values are right than on convincing them that my facts are right. When I focus on persuasion, in other words, I may be using my scientific knowledge to help me build a persuasive case, but the argument isn't primarily scientific. It's about the kind of world in which we choose to live.
Science communication is different. When focusing on communication, the aim isn't (or shouldn't be) to advocate for a particular policy position. It is (or ought to be) to provide information. In many such cases, that means providing "pure" information, interesting stuff about the world that's just good to know, not stuff you need to know to make decisions. In other cases, that means providing policy relevant information. When information is policy relevant and a scientist is focusing on communication rather than persuasion, the scientist ought to be acting as an honest broker, providing policy makers with information on the consequences of different policy choices, not promoting particular policy outcomes. Even when acting as an honest broker, the scientist will have to choose a frame, but the frame (s)he chooses should not favor one outcome over the other.
So the missing element in the framing debates is this: When is it appropriate for a scientist to don the hat of citizen and advocate for a particular policy outcome, and when it is appropriate to act as an honest broker? Framing will play an important role in either case, but the type of framing will be quite different.
1Or at least in the scientific blogosphere.
2I think they're all pretty bad myself.
The revisions would, among other things,
[A]llow federal agencies to avoid consultation with the Fish & Wildlife Service when the effects on a listed species or its designated critical habitat "[a]re not capable of being meaningfully identified or detected in a manner that permits evaluation." And who gets to make the decision about whether that criterion is met? You guessed it. The agency who wants to do something that will affect a listed species.The revisions are a bad idea for the same reason that asking a fox to guard the hen house doesn't work. It doesn't take an experiment to know that the fox's interest isn't in protecting the hens, and it's experiments and observation that are characteristic of science. In short, if we care about the hens, it doesn't take science to tell us that we need someone to watch the fox.
Look carefully at that last sentence. "if we care about the hens...." Can science tell us whether we should worry about hens -- endangered species? No. How much we should care about endangered species is a question of ethical and aesthetic values. So there's a second sense in which it isn't my scientific expertise isn't what tells me that the revisions are a bad idea.
My scientific expertise tells me that the rate at which we are currently losing species is greater than at any time in the last sixty five million years. My scientific expertise tells me that the species we are losing are those that are unique to particular places on the globe and that the species replacing them are becoming more and more widespread. My scientific expertise tells me that the world is becoming more biologically homogeneous. My scientific expertise tells me that the increased homogenization may make ecosystems more sensitive to perturbation. My scientific expertise tells me that the biotic environment at the end of the 21st century will be very different from the one we have now if current trends continue.
But my scientific expertise can't tell me whether any of those things are good or bad.2 Whether an outcome is good or bad depends on whether it matches the way we want the world to be, and I don't need an experiment to tell me that I prefer a world with abundant biodiversity to one dominated by a few ubiquitous species. My preference for a world full of diversity is an ethical or aesthetic preference, not a scientific one.
Why do I go on so long about this, and how does it relate to framing and persuasion? Like this.
Framing is necessary for persuasion. Framing is necessary, for example, to persuade people that loss of biodiversity is a crisis that demands attention. But in making that case I am focusing more on convincing others that my values are right than on convincing them that my facts are right. When I focus on persuasion, in other words, I may be using my scientific knowledge to help me build a persuasive case, but the argument isn't primarily scientific. It's about the kind of world in which we choose to live.
Science communication is different. When focusing on communication, the aim isn't (or shouldn't be) to advocate for a particular policy position. It is (or ought to be) to provide information. In many such cases, that means providing "pure" information, interesting stuff about the world that's just good to know, not stuff you need to know to make decisions. In other cases, that means providing policy relevant information. When information is policy relevant and a scientist is focusing on communication rather than persuasion, the scientist ought to be acting as an honest broker, providing policy makers with information on the consequences of different policy choices, not promoting particular policy outcomes. Even when acting as an honest broker, the scientist will have to choose a frame, but the frame (s)he chooses should not favor one outcome over the other.
So the missing element in the framing debates is this: When is it appropriate for a scientist to don the hat of citizen and advocate for a particular policy outcome, and when it is appropriate to act as an honest broker? Framing will play an important role in either case, but the type of framing will be quite different.
1Or at least in the scientific blogosphere.
2I think they're all pretty bad myself.
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