Consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist theories of ethics

There are two broad categories of ethical theories concerning the rightness or wrongness of actions: consquentialist and non-consequentialist.

• A consequentialist theory judges the rightness or wrongness of an action based on the consequences that action has. The most familiar example would be utilitarianism--``that action is best that produces the greatest good for the greatest number'' (Jeremy Bentham).
  • Over what ``ethical community'' are the consequences to be measured? Does damage to trees count as much as damage to human beings?
    • John Stuart Mill--``Socrates dissatisfied should have more moral weight than a pig satisfied.''

  • The criterion might be satisfied by an action that causes great harm to a small number of people while giving a small benefit to a great number.

  • Biodiversity implication--Biodiversity has instrumental value, because it can contribute to human welfare, but it has no intrinsic value.

• A non-consequentialist theory of value judges the rightness or wrongness of an action based on properties intrinsic to the action, not on its consequences.
  • Libertarianism--People should be free to do as they like as long as they respect the freedom of others to do the same.
    • Biodiversity implication--Biodiversity has instrumental value, and only to the extent that it can contribute to the expression of individual freedom.

      It might be possible to develop a libertarian theory that included the rights of non-human organisms to be ``free'', but (a) I'm not aware that it's been done⁴ and (b) I think it would be very difficult to do.⁵

  • Contractarianism--No policy that causes uncompensated harm to anyone is permitted (Pareto safety).
    • Biodiversity implication--Depending on how broadly the term ``anyone'' is defined⁶ biodiversity might or might not have intrinsic value. In a widely influential version of contractarianism due to John Rawls, it is very difficult to imagine how biodiversity could have intrinsic value.⁷

      Here there have been philosophers, notably ``deep ecologists'' and those promoting animal rights who have attempted to extend ethical theories that fall broadly within this realm to non-human organisms, or at least to animals.

      More recently, Martha Nussbaum has developed a contractarian approach to ethics that is broader than the one Rawls proposed.⁸ While Nussbaum develops her ideas in ways that allow the contractual approach to be applied to non-humans, that extension involves something like ``rights'' for individual animals, not for species and certainly not for biodiversity.⁹

In any case it should be clear from this brief discussion that although appeals to intrinsic value sound good and make us feel good, they are very difficult to justify philosophically.