... economics''1
This essay is available as a PDF at http://www.miis.edu/academics/faculty/jscorse. It's not very long, and I encourage you to read it.
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... catastrophes2
Balmford et al. [1], for example, argue that ``the benefit:cost ratio of an effective global program for the conservation of remaining wild nature is at least 100:1.'' Others, like Child [2], think the whole exercise is misguided. We'll return to that discussion after we first see some of the ways in which economic principles are used.
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... reserves.3
Keep in mind here that we're not talking about the dollar value of goods sold to consumers. We're talking about the dollar value the person extracting resources from the forest receives from the first person in the distribution chain. The mark-ups along the way don't help the person who is extracting the resource, and if development is to be sustainable, that person needs to receive enough money to support her needs.
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... resource.4
The discussion that follows is loosely based on an argument that goes back to Colin Clark [3]
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... choose?5
For purposes of this thought experiment, you can assume that I am completely trustworthy and that there's no risk I'll renege on my offer.
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... well-being6
How kind of you!
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... is7
Skip to the last line if you don't like calculus.
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... scenario8
Courtesy of The Economist, 26 June 1999, p. 90.
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... cod.9
Or how much we'd be willing to give up to ensure that we live in a world that has cod.
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... are,10
And we'll talk about that a little later.
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... off.11
That's known as a Pareto equilibrium.
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... that.12
The Economist, 26 June 1999, p. 90.
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... logic.13
Or at least they seem to follow conventional economic logic. But remember, I'm not an economist, so what do I know.
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... arguments:14
An assumption that conservation biologists should feel entirely comfortable with.
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... election.15
As of 3:00pm CST, Friday 25 November 2011, a contract that will pay $1 if Romney wins the Republican presidential nomination would have cost you $0.69. The price for a contract that will pay $1 if Gingrich wins the nomination was $0.17. None of the other candidates in the market (Huntsman and Santorum aren't even included) have contracts associated with them that would have cost more than $0.03.
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... anyway?16
Well, I could endow a bunch of graduate fellowships at UConn, help to conserve a bunch of land in other parts of the world, and do some other good things. I probably would find a way to use it.
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